Unbiased

Arjun: During the pandemic, it seemed like nearly everyone got into the habit of comparing various statistics across countries to make their case for either stronger or weaker pandemic restrictions. But what does the complete data from two years show now on which measures were most successful and which were not?
On Unbiased today is Danish political scientist, Michael Bang Peterson. Michael led project HOPE, an effort examining responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in democratic countries and contributing to the Danish government's response to the pandemic. For his amazing work on this project on citizen and government trust in Denmark during the pandemic, he earned a 2022 Forskningskommunikationsprisen, I hope I got that right, the research communication award from the Danish ministry of higher education in science. Prior to the pandemic, Michael was actually better known for his work on how social media affects the distribution of fake news and misinformation.
His research often goes beyond easy scapegoats, like social media as evil, and looks for the root cause to serious issues that plague society today. So Dan and I are delighted to welcome Michael to Unbiased today. Welcome, Michael.

Michael: Thank you very much.

Arjun: So Michael, the first question I have is around COVID of course. And in early 2022, Denmark lifted all COVID restrictions - masks, vaccine mandates, et cetera, even as cases were rising with Omicron. So I'm curious why you guys did this and what the reaction was.

Michael: The basic reason why the restrictions were lifted, was that the sort of legal framework, that regulates pandemic management in Denmark states that it should be a critical threat to society before you can have restrictions. And at that time, it was difficult to actually, argue that COVID was a critical threat to society in the sense that it wasn't really putting heavy pressure on the hospital system.
So we saw rising cases with Omicron, but it didn't translate. Into a massive amount of people coming into ICUs, for example,and essentially that was the reason that, okay, we no longer have legal basis for upholding the restrictions according to the way that the pandemic has been managed.

Dan: One question for you, Michael, too, building on that is, when we looked at countries like Sweden or Denmark from across the Atlantic here in the United States, what we saw was a lot of clarity and a lot of maybe sensible action for lack of a better phrasing. Whereas here in the US, I think there was, most people's perspective, there was certainly a lack of clarity and at times it was chaotic. When you look at the US pandemic response. What do you see and maybe what could have been done better?


Michael: Yeah,I think trying to understand the United States pandemic response is pretty important for understanding crisis management in general. and it seems to me that it went, worse than it perhaps, should, have. and I think that the sort of best, case for that is if we go back in time until November, 2019, just before the pandemic, hit, there was a big report being, published, which was actually assessing, different countries' abilities to handle, pandemics and the country that came out on top.
Of this,in this assessment was United States. So the idea in 2019 November, was that the country in the world that would be best able to deal with the pandemic was United States. and I think the reason why United States came out on top in that assessment was that, for all the good things in United States, there's a lot of economic muscles.
There is, a very high degree of scientific expertise and technological E. and we saw that, also being, being used and utilized in the best possible way, doing the pandemic, for example, with the operation w speed, which I think has been very important in developing the vaccines, the problem.
Which this assessment was forgetting,it, it did play a role in it, but they didn't take it seriously enough in my perspective was the, what you can call the human factor the behavioral science side of things. and again, I think the development of the vaccines illustrates it very clearly that united States were incredibly important in developing the vaccine, but had a very hard time actually getting people to take the vaccine, after it was invented. And I think that is where the issues come in is in the relationship between the citizen. And the authorities. That even if a vaccine is being, developed, there has been difficulties in communicating, about it.
and in, actually convincing people that this solution is something that you should utilize. and I think that the most simple answer to why things were more difficult than they perhaps should have. In the United States is a lack of trust, between citizens, and between, citizens and authorities.

Arjun: I see, Since Dan brought it up,he mentioned Sweden. As most people know Sweden was famously or maybe infamously, somewhat relaxed and did not lock down the country formally. Although, people did restrict their movements, voluntarily quite a bit.
Over in Denmark. What did you guys think about Sweden's handling and now two years afterwards, how do you reflect and see what Sweden did? Did they do anything right? Did they do anything wrong?

Michael: So I think that's a very, I important question and a very interesting question. and actually, over the last few weeks in Denmark, there has been a huge debate exactly. on that issue. Like what did Sweden do, and what did Sweden do, wrong? I think that,
it's difficult to come up with, a simple, answer to the question. if we look at what Sweden actually did, there were huge mistakes made in the very, very first weeks, and days, which meant that they had a massive loss of lives in homes for the elderly. So they were not very, oriented or very successful in protecting the elderly but afterwards,they had more consistent, way of handling the pandemic. so they had a ceiling on how many people could meet , out, in the public, around, 50.
and they had that for a very long time. In that regard. It's also important to say that it's not that Sweden didn't do anything like they, were in fact limiting gatherings. they had a lot , of communication about the importance of actually , taking, health advice seriously.
I think according to their own,evaluations, there was, A lot of things done wrong in the first weeks, especially when it comes to protecting the elderly. I think they did well, or better, afterwards I think the single most important thing that I think they did right, was to not close the schools.
I think in retrospect, many Danes would say that we shouldn't, have closed, schools to the same extent, that we did, both in the first wave that we had in March. And the second wave that we had in, in December,I think most, X person Denmark would agree on that.

Michael: But at the same time, I think that there was also a lot of other things done wrong in Sweden, especially in the beginning. And according to the only evaluations that were, has also been miscommunication and the authorities have not. Been communicating very clearly to the public.
that's the sense of the evaluations made. Whereas, a third Scandinavian country, Norway has been put out as the poster country for clear communication, from the health authorities. and in fact, sometimes I, as a Dean go to the Norwegian health authorities, to look at what is their assessment of current evidence and so on because they do it very transparently, very clearly lay out what do we know?

Michael: What do we not know at this point?

Arjun: I I see, and by the way, Dan, sorry, if I can just ask one quick follow up. one of the things that I'm curious about, Michael, and I think some of your research talks about this is what have been the. Effects of lockdowns and enclosures on the public's general mental health and social. I don't know stability, if you will.
Have you noticed any detrimental impacts at all in Denmark, more so than the baseline in relative to perhaps neighboring Nordic countries?

Michael: Yeah, we can clearly see that lockdowns do have an effect on the mental health of,of citizens. It is. It is designed, to, lockdowns are designed to, to create social isolation. that's the whole idea, with them,and humans are social animals and that means that it does take a toll.
when you iron in lockdown,it creates Loneliness that sense of loneliness,is what, according to our research is driving this sense of pandemic fatigue, where you feel that you cannot keep up with restrictions that you cannot,manage to, to keep, following the health advice.
and that yet again,is then influencing the way that people,look at the state so when first you have those feelings of loneliness, this sense of fatigue, then you begin to direct your frustrations, towards those who are immediately responsible, for the lockdown. So you don't blame the virus, so to speak, you blame the authorities, you blame the politicians.

Michael: And that means that when you have lockdown it will slowly begin. to decrease the trust that people have, in the authorities and in the political system,that is especially the case. Again, according to our research, when you have lockdowns in a situation with very low mortality.
So when a real,wave is hitting, when a lot of people are dying, then you can sort. Beer, the cost of the lockdown more easily, you can see a meaning to it. but it's, especially in situations where you have lower mortality, where you have fewer deaths that's when it really begins to where you out to, to sit at home and not do anything.
and in order to come back to the question about why it was that Denmark lifted the restrictions here in, in early 2022. that was also because that there was an awareness of this that well, restrictions do have costs. so we cannot just keep restrictions, without an end.

Michael: We, we need to always carefully balance the costs and benefits of the interventions that we are.
that was one thing I noticed too, when I was digging into your work what is it that makes Americans so much less trustful of institutions than folks in Denmark, for example,

Michael: Yeah. So I think that's probably the big question that all of us should take away from this crisis. This pandemic is that, to me, it has been proof of the importance of trust. And we all need to think deeply about how we can create more trusting societies.
And, and of course this is something that we already know something about from the social sciences and from the work of political scientists. and it seems. That there are like three major factors, that play, a role in creating a , trusting society. one is, the level of ethnic homogeneity.
it is simply more easy to create. Higher levels of trust in a country, which is small, where every, everyone shares the same cultural background. it's much easier to imagine being in other people's shoes when you have the same cultural, background.
but that doesn't mean that, without ethnic homogeneity, you cannot have a trusting society because I think it's the least important factor, compared to the two, others and those two others are first of all, economic equality and it is trustworthy institutions without, and if we look at, if we look at Denmark, then it's, it's consistently one of the countries with the lowest levels of corruption, in the world.
and Denmark as this sort of Scandinavian welfare, society is a country with, with very high, equality. and I think when we are to understand some of the political developments that, are happening in United States and also in other countries, including European countries, such as France, where we can see that

Michael: distrust is increasing there's higher degrees of polarization. Then I think a crucial factor is, is, the level of, economic, equality, which has been going down over the last, three, four decades, in a lot of countries.

Arjun: So since you brought it up around polarization, maybe we can switch gears to that. somewhat, because this is also something you've studied, a fair amount. what do you think is driving polarization? , it sounds like you're saying. A key driver of increased polarization is economic inequality.
yes, I think, I think. At this point, there's a lot of things that we don't know about polarization. but,if I was to, bet on something as the root course, then I think we have current, some current data that suggests that economic equality is pretty important, in that respect.

Dan: One thing I wanna highlight here or something you said that really interests me, is that getting back to the Nordic model, it's something that a lot of folks here in the United States envy. We really envy the egalitarian society and the strong social safety net, or at least some, I think on the American left do, which is for by European standards, probably the European center.
but it does seem that one of the things that's required for Denmark to operate like Denmark or Sweden to operate like Sweden is a high degree of conform. High degree of people all doing the same things, which is very difficult to pull off unless you have a highly homogenous population. Is that a fair assessment?
think it's a fair assessment and I do think that at the core of having, an equalitarian society, is the. is the sense of solidarity. and we know that solidarity is linked to feelings of empathy, which are related to this sense

Michael: That I can be in your shoes that I can sense how it is to be in, in your shoes as a poor person. it's I have the sense that it could have been me, if it wasn't for some chance factors. and in, in that regard, I think it's important to say that there is a pretty complex relationship between actually having high degrees of redistribution.
and then having that sense of solidarity. it's not just that, that you have solidarity, then you build the institutions on top of it. but there also feedback loops where when you actually have institutions that. Provides a lot of redistribution then that is actually also creating solidarity in itself.
it's some something that some of my Danish colleagues have been working, on to understand, but to, give a sort of very concrete example, Take taking the bus in Denmark and United States, are two different experiences. when I take the bus in Denmark, I see, people, who are just like me.
that's not the sense that I get when I enter a bus in United, states. and it seems to be that because that there are really poor segments of society in United States that, creates these sort of both, visually clear differences,of how people dress, how people behave, that

Michael: in a way it's, there's many more markers of social class in United States than there is,in a country like, Denmark. and that's partly because the fact that you have lower redistribution means that there are these markers that you can see. Whereas even if you're unemployed in Denmark, you cannot see it.
so you go around in Danish society and you will sympathize or feel a likeness with everyone you meet. Whereas if you have less redistribution, it's much more. Easy to create these sort of feelings of different that, oh, these people, they look different, they act different.
And that in itself is something that undercuts,the feelings of solidarity. so the relationship between institutions and solidarity is complex.
I have a follow up question to that. Arjun if you're alright with it, which is, it's interesting. You say that because even if you took a look at the 2016 election, there was definitely a clear sense. and I'll say on the Trump side, that. He was representing a group of people who were looked down on, or he was representing a group of people who really shut out from,a larger conversation.

Dan: And,if I'm hearing you correctly, it sounds like the solidarity that might exist due to being a more homogenous community is going to help the creation of institutions. That'll distribute wealth more equally. But the creation of those institutions can also create the solidarity, that in a, again, a more diverse society such as the United States.
is that correct?
that is correct. and I think that's really the difficult, part about the situation in the United States because,in order to deal with the polarization that United States, is facing, then. in my view, you need to, deal with, economic, inequality, but that's very difficult to deal with, in a situation with a lot of polarization, because there

Michael: in . Fact,you, need to provide resources, provide money to groups that you see as being at the other side, like who are seen as the enemy,in the political, polarized, competition.

Arjun: So let's talk about this, concept of ethnic homogeneity, which you've brought up a few times now. you wrote a book back in 2005, that there was this Danish newspaper that published cartoons that were poking fun at, the Muslim prophet Muhammad and,it received widespread backlash and the Muslim community, a bunch of clerics, a lot of middle Eastern governments were furious that, this would happen in Denmark and papers were burned and flags were burned and all these sorts of things.
And we were expecting. Quite a blowback in Denmark, but it didn't seem to happen. And so I'm curious this fairly homogenous white, Caucasian society, if you will, why did it not blow up?

Michael:
Yes. So we, we were surprised, as well, for sure, because we did expect a backlash against, Muslim minorities in this situation. and first of all, I should probably say that if we look at. The sort of, Muslim sentiments in the Danish majority, population,then there is a pretty large,proportion of Danes that do have, some sort of anti-Muslim.
sentiments,the far parties in Denmark, are, are gaining a lot of votes,in the national, elections. so it's not that there isn't any,Muslim sentiment,in Dan society. but what was surprising to us was that they didn't become worse because one could think that now people have sort of an excuse to, increase, anti-Muslim sentiments, because Danish embassies were burned down in the middle east, following the publication of, of these, cartoons.

Michael: So what our analysis is that it relates to the way politically elite, reacted that politically elites were very firm on the principles of equal treatment. they were very firm on saying that this is not a conflict between. different types of religions.
and in that sense, the way that the elite communicated about the whole affair, I think was very important in the way that the Danish public, reacted. So we did see a backlash, but it wasn't against. Muslims, but the worst tendencies for backlash against Islamic fundamentalists.
so there were a backlash against the sort of most extreme versions, of Islam, but not against Muslims per se. but this whole, study that, that we did and this whole experience with the, with the, with the cartoon crisis in Denmark has also been personally important for me for the work that I've been doing in the context takes up the pandemic because it essentially, told me that.
people are not as bad as their reputation. and they're not always as bad as psychological theories, will make them look because most psychological theories would predict that. Of course. People react against an outgroup, whenever they get, the chance, but we didn't see that. and especially because the elites,kept their balance, then the public did as well.
and that was one of my main messages in the beginning of, the pandemic that as, long as we avoid polarization,then people will react in a pretty balanced, way uh,

Dan: Do you feel that the incentives of political elites will dictate their behavior as well, or in the case of Denmark dictated their behavior? Because I do know in the United States, there's definitely a very strong incentive amongst those seeking election to really split the electorate on identity issues.
Does that incentive system not exist in Denmark or is it just not culturally acceptable in Danish politic?

Michael: That is a very good, question. and I think if we, look at how Danish elite, political elites have been reacting during the COVID, pandemic, then they have been very oriented towards, compromise. so the government and the opposition, at some pretty critical times,they figured out a common position,and Promoted that rather than trying to pull in different, directions.
and of course there has been, very heated debates, and very polarized debates at certain times. but it seemed that every time where my sense was okay, things are getting out of hand right now, they sort of locked themselves into a room and, came up with an agreement that everyone could see themselves, in.

Michael: And so the way that the opposition parties have been explaining that, has been, with reference to the incentives, they say, we would get punished by the electorate if we didn't do that, if we weren't,responsible if we weren't, trying to come up with a common strategy together with the government.
but I think it's that the fact that they themselves phrased it as like the responsible thing is also telling something about. The sort of norms that are governing, Danish society. and I think, my own personal judgment is that if we look at strictly at the electoral incentives, then.

Michael: There was something to be gained by polarizing, the pandemic management, even in a Danish society. That is my sense. And there are, a particular sort of radical right wing political party who have been doing it, pretty successfully, but they have been the only. Party doing it. And I think that the sort of other and larger opposition parties, could also have done it, but in the end chose not to, valuing compromise, over, over short term electoral gains.
And I think that is something that has been very important for the Danish, response. And I think if we look at the way that. That the Danish media have been writing about these things. Then they have been very much focused on the government and everything the government has done both right and wrong.
But I think actually the Danish pandemic management also owes a lot to, the opposition and that they didn't,Use the opportunities that I think were there for polarizing, the discussions about the pandemic.

Arjun: One thing I wanna talk about is, How, you said that Denmark has a fairly homogenous society. it facilitates a lot of trust. You understand each other, you can be in each other's shoes. Of course, the United States is very different. We're quite a heterogeneous society, lots and lots of immigrants.
I grew up in Canada, similar sort of situation. but now Europe is seeing this flood of refugees often from Africa coming into society. I'm curious. How are Danes seeing this play out? Do they want refugees? Are they worried? It's going to upset the balance of this homogeneity and this understanding of each other?
certainly some countries like Sweden seem to have been more accepting of refugees. but I think it's fair to say. They're also seeing a level of civil disturb. That is higher now than perhaps in recent decades. So what are you guys in Denmark seeing and how is the public reacting to this flood of refugees? Are your politicians saying, Nope, close the borders. We don't want them, et cetera.

Michael: Yeah. I think,the immigration debates, are very different in United States and Europe. and. I think that a lot of the arguments that would be seen as extremely right wing in a United States context are routinely made, in a European, context. I think if we just look .
at the focus of what, what is being discussed in United States, when you discuss immigration, then it's often illegal immigration that is being discussed where that is completely off the table. In your European countries. It's always legal immigration because everyone would agree.

Michael: No, we shouldn't. Illegal immigrants coming into the country. we shouldn't extend rights to illegal immigrants. I would say, that a very large majority of Europeans would think as that is just a given. so the debates, when it's about immigration in Europe, it's always about legal, immigration.
Should we reduce, legal, immigration or not?
There, there is also a very, big distinction between,fleeing for reasons of security or, coming to Europe,for more economic, reasons. and. At least in Denmark, there is high degrees of, solidarity with refugees, for example, coming from Ukraine right now, there's a lot of solidarity,with them, but there is a, pretty large opposition, towards, migrants coming, to
get, or to have better lives,from a more sort of economic, perspective, like people are, positive towards, immigrants that they see as being able to contribute, to society. So highly skilled, immigrants, highly educated immigrants, or just immigrants where they can see, or where they feel are people who are motivated, to contribute, a lot where you see the opposition, is, is towards, Groups of migrants with lower, education, less work skills aware for some reason they have been framed or construed as a group that, is not interested in contributing, that much to society.
and some of the work that we have been doing, Finds that this is, this understanding is something that we see both on the left wing or, and on the right wing. So there's a pretty large consensus, into any society actually about who is it that we should allow into the country and who shouldn't we allow into the country.

Michael: And that, I think a lot of this is about also coming back to the welfare state that. It is really about who do you want to let in to be part of this sort of, system of solidarity, where we are accepting that we will take care of you.

Dan: That is it's so interesting you say that, cuz I think. Getting back to the idea of norms and getting back to the idea of maybe the national story of American immigration, whether we act on it in policy or not is give me your poor, you're tired, your huddled masses, like the image of somebody immigrating to the United States is usually not necessarily like.
Your you're highly skilled individual, whether that's a reality in terms of our policy or not is another question. the second part and the follow up to that of course, is that we can do that. Cuz when you get here, we're really not paying for anything. So you're on your own and I'm sorry, Arjun I cut you off there.
It sounded like you had a
no. I think that's a, exactly spot on, at some level, Michael, maybe I'll ask the uncomfortable question that, do you think there's an element of racism when it comes to Danish immigration? Being more accepting of Ukrainians. Of course they are going to a horrendous war. Very understandable.

Arjun: But if you just, as an example, take Sri Lanka right now, the country is collapsing. It's government is effectively non-existent they've had several wars for quite a long time. Do you think Danish society would be equally accepting of Sri Lankan immigrants as they would Ukrainian immigrants?

I think that there are, certainly a tendency to sympathize more with people from Ukraine, because it is, closer, to Denmark. , there's more shared cultural background. And then I think the biggest, factor is that there is a sense that, Danes and Europeans and, people from Ukraine are, fighting on the same side that Ukraine are

Michael: in part fighting, a fight, for the rest of Europe. and I think that is important driver of the highest solidarity that we see. but we do know that things like,empathy influenced. By similarity. so I do think that we would see less, sympathy, less solidarity with other groups, other refugee groups.
and I think we have seen it, also, in Syria. Where, there has been, pretty severe backlash against, some of the migrant groups from, Syria where we have not seen that, when it comes to Ukraine, but it's difficult to disentangle all the factors that, I confounded here.
and I think that there is really something important. In this feeling that Ukraine and the European union are in it together, against Russia, which I think, makes a lot of, difference. but again, coming back to the, point that a lot of the rhetoric in Europe would be considered very right wing in United States.

Michael: Is that when you guys talk about. The wall, against Mexico,and the building off of the wall, associated with Trump. These are already realities in Europe. like there are,if not real walls but a lot of fences that are, heavily protected,in order to keep, refugees from north Africa, from the middle east, out of, European union

Dan: do you. Jen, I have a, I'm gonna just put this comment into the recording. I'll clap so you can see it. you may wanna put this after my last comment, but I'll leave it to you as far as where you wanna put it. one of the questions I had though, building on the migration or legal migration to Europe is. When you look at a country like Denmark, or, the UK Germany, what have you, there's this filter, you don't have a direct border with a lot of the affected regions. When you look to countries like Greece, for example, or Italy, they're very much on the front lines of migration from Africa and the middle east is the debate, their different than what you might see in Northern European countries that are a little further remove.
so that, that is a good question. and I don't know enough of the, of the data to speak to it. very well. but what we do know from the sort of broader research is that. when the costs of something increase,then it becomes more difficult to express, solidarity and it's clear that there are more.

Michael: Costs of opening the borders,for a country like Italy and a country,Greece. So compared to a country like Denmark or compared to a country like Sweden, because we assembly further removed, from. Where refugees, enter. but at the same time,if we look at the data, then it's not that the Scandinavian countries are particularly happy, about, migration from the middle, east even though there are, further removed from the entry point.
okay. We're, almost up on time and I do wanna cover a little bit of your research on social media and fake news because you've spent a lot of time study. Of course, it's something that Dan and I think about a lot, certainly in, my day job at the factual we do, let's start at the very beginning, how serious a problem is fake news.
and maybe even is the term fake news and misinformation. Are those still useful terms or are they applied to viewpoints? That one side just doesn't agree with versus being actually inaccurate. So maybe start there, how serious is this?
so I, I think that,the way that I see, misinformation and false information is that it is more a symptom of problems than it's a problem, in itself. we, know from a lot of, research, outside of, social media research. when you have, high degrees of group conflict, when you have very polarized sentiments, then people begin to spread all sorts of, information that will denigrate their opponents.
and in that process, they care more, about whether the information is useful. For that purpose then whether it's truthful,or not. so that means that when misinformation and false information begin to circulate, especially false information or misinformation, that is portraying other political groups in a negative light.
then it's, an indication that you have some kind of conflict, going on and. it's not that people are necessarily persuaded a lot about this information. Like people are pretty resistant, to information in, in general. and. That also applies to misinformation.

Michael: It's not that you see a, some kind of crazy claim on social media and then you suddenly think, oh, that must be right. you believe it. if it fits your priors, if it doesn't, then you don't believe it. so it is really these priors and in particular polarized sense of negative affect towards other political groups.
that to me is the real problem. and the circulation of misinformation is just. The symptom, of that. That doesn't mean that, there isn't a small, negative effect of being exposed, to these kinds of things. but I would say that it's. That's not what we should mainly, be concerned about.

Michael: We should mainly be concerned by the underlying, sentiments that, makes it,makes it spread in the first place.

Dan: You know that this kind of gets back to what we were talking about earlier in this conversation, I don't know how the size of the push, but there's a push in the United States to regulate social media. In some way, either, either restrict the amount of information, what kind of information could be spread or restrict the ability of social media outlets to just do this UN to do this haphazardly. If I'm hearing you correctly, it sounds like maybe that's the wrong idea. Regulating social media channels is the wrong idea and really where we should be focused are on the drivers of mistrust that allow this misinformation to have such an effect. Am I correct?
Yes, at least partly so I'm not sure that I necessarily think that it's wrong to regulate social media or that it's a bad idea to regulate social media, I would discourage very strongly the idea that it will help much. politicians and policy makers, shouldn't have the idea that, if we can just perch Facebook and Twitter from misinformation, then United States will be a peaceful, nice, countries to live in.

Michael: I think, the regulation of social media will have, very little. on, on the actual problems, that United States,is facing. and to the extent that there is a like zero sum, relationships between, the different types of solutions that you can invest in, than investing more in, in regulating social media.
will mean that there's less attention on actually fixing the root cause of the problems that the United States and other, democratic countries, are facing. so my main concern is that there's, too much focus or that the focus on regulating social media, that it.

Michael: Takes away attention from the actual, actual problems. and when I'm in my sort of more cynical, mode of thinking, then. then what I'm also concerned about is that if you're a politician, then it's actually, then it's actually, pretty convenient to focus on social media because that sort of alleviates the, your responsibility to actually deal with the real problems in society.
so I fear that it can. it is. Yes, it's, it's, something that can be too, it can be an attractive narrative that I fear can have problems, because it directs attention, away from what I think, the real problems. And again, I think, economic, inequality is,is one place to start it's.

Michael: Way more difficult to actually deal with than putting in some more filters on, on.

Arjun: By the way, if economic inequality is a driver and, ostensibly, I would think so as well. You can always find examples where that's not the case. So for example, Hungary, I think has a fairly even, distribution of wealth. It's not highly unequal. And yet they have, Farid parties that are doing very well there and I don't know if it's polarization, but certainly the desire to not mix with other people is very strong there. So how do you explain that? Is it really economic inequality? That is the driver of polarization.
so I think a again,I think that there are the sort of two big factors are economic, inequality and corruption. and if we look at Hungary, then they might be pretty equal, but they have huge. Problems when it comes to corruption and have pretty weak, political, institutions.
so I don't think that economic, equality is the only thing that, that matters. we can be equal and miserable, together. I think what really matters is that you have. Trustworthy political institutions. and one of the things that I think is good for those institutions to do is to at least in ensure that there are,some pretty,a satisfactory level of redistribution.
I don't think that, that it's clear how much redistribution you need in a society. but I think what is pretty clear is that you need as slow corruption as possible in the institution. So what the biggest factor of creating trust in political institutions is if these institutions are trustworthy, in the first.

Arjun: Fair point. that's a really good recap. And at least for a lot of our listeners who are probably based in the us, I think we're always thinking, how do we increase trust, in our institutions, us, I think our level of corruption in the us and institutions is not too high, certainly compared to a lot of other countries.
So maybe in the us, the economic inequality is a bigger factor. Then perhaps it might be in Europe where, or at least in Eastern European countries where maybe it's the reverse. but that's fascinating. I know we're just over time, Michael and I do not wanna wreck your beer brewing because that would be a complete tragedy, especially for a Bel nail.
But, anything else that you have Dan.

Dan: No, this was honestly Michael, this. I the,I really just, I really enjoyed this conversation and this filled a lot of pieces in, I know for me, in terms of my understanding of why we are, where we are. So I really appreciate the time.

Michael: Oh, thank you very much.

Arjun: thank you so much.